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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF BOBBY E. PANGBURN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW
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) Supreme Court Docket No. 38215-2010
) ISB FILE NO. FC 10-07
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)
)
)
)
)

IDAHO STATE BAR,
P laintiff-Respondent,
v.
BOBBY E. PANGBURN,
Respondent-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the ISB Professional Conduct Board Hearing Committee,
Chairman Randall R. Adams, Presiding.
For Plaintiff-Respondent, Idaho State Bar:
Bradley G. Andrews (ISB # 2576)
Bar Counsel
Idaho State Bar
P.O. Box 895
Boise, ID 83702
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Respondent-Appellant, Bobby E. Pangburn:
Bobby E. Pangburn (ISB #3892)
P.O. Box 2562
Eagle, ID 83616
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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an attorney discipline case.

A Hearing Committee ("Committee") of the

Professional Conduct Board has recommended to this Court that Appellant Bobby E. Pangburn
("Appellant") be disbarred for professional misconduct and that the effective date of disbarment
be February 1,2010.

B.

Course of Discipline Proceedings

In a prior Idaho formal charge reciprocal disciplinary case, Appellant was suspended for
five years, with three years withheld, commencing January 31, 2008. That suspension arose out

I
I

of Appellant's representation of clients in Oregon. In August 2004, Respondent resigned in lieu

11II~

admission of any violation of the Oregon rules of professional conduct. (R., pp. 185-186.)

m

•

of discipline in Oregon. Consistent with the Oregon rules, the resignation did not include an

Appellant's two-year suspension commenced January 31, 2008 following issuance of a
Disciplinary Order by this Court on January 17, 2008. (Exhibit 9, pp. 9-12.) Appellant was

I

eligible to request reinstatement following that suspension on February 1, 2010. (R., p. 186.)
However, on May 20, 2010, before Appellant requested reinstatement, the Idaho State
Bar ("ISB") filed the Complaint in this disciplinary matter. (R., p. 186.) The Complaint alleged
that Appellant committed specified acts of professional misconduct in conjunction with the
representation of two clients.

II'
!

Count One alleged that Appellant violated LR.P.C. 1.16(d)

[Failure to refund unearned fees upon termination of representation] and 8.4(c) [Conduct
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involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation]. Count Two alleged that Appellant
violated I.R.P.C. 1.3 [Failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness], 1.7(a) [Conflict
of interest] and 8.4( d) [Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice]. Count
Three alleged that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 5.5(a) [Engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law], I.B.C.R. 516(a)(10) [Practicing law after effective date of suspension] and I.B.C.R.
516( a)(7) [Failing to remove attorney listing from telephone directory]. (R., pp. 2-12.)
The Committee was assigned on June 1,2010. (R., pp. 13-14.) The Committee issued a
Scheduling Order on August 2, 2010 that required Respondent to file an answer by August 9,
2010 and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 6 and 7, 2010. (R., pp. 17-19.) On
August 9, 2010, Appellant filed his Answer. The Answer denied that Appellant violated the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct alleged in the Complaint. (R., pp. 20-24.) On August 13,
2010, the ISB served its First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents.
(R., pp. 25-26.)
"~I
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On October 6, 2010, the parties filed a Stipulation.

The Stipulation provided that

Appellant would serve an additional 18 months suspension, an additional 18 months of
suspension would be withheld, and it specified terms and conditions relating to reinstatement and
a three year probation upon terms and conditions. (R., pp. 28-92.)
Paragraph 7 of that Stipulation provided that "if the Hearing Committee of the
Professional Conduct Board or the Idaho Supreme Court declines to accept this StipUlation
and/or Recommendation, each party has the right to withdraw from this Stipulation and proceed
to hearing on the merits."

(R., p. 38.)

On October 27, 2010, the Committee issued its

Recommendation consistent with the Stipulation. (R., pp. 93-95.) On October 28, 2010, the

II

Clerk of the Professional Conduct Board filed the record with the Idaho Supreme Court.
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On November 30,2010, the Court issued its Order to Remand. That order remanded the
case to the Committee "for the reconsideration of more significant sanctions." (R., p. 184.)
On February 18, 2011, the Committee entered a Scheduling Order scheduling an
evidentiary hearing on April 4, 2011.
Stipulation on March 30, 2011.

(R., pp. 98-99.)

The parties filed a Pre-Hearing

In the Pre-Hearing Stipulation, the paIiies stipulated to the

admission of facts, the ISB's Exhibits 1-9 and Appellant's Exhibit 10 and that the hearing would
be limited to the issue of the recommended sanction.
conducted on April 4, 2011.

(R., pp. 100-114.) The hearing was

(R., pp. 115-182 (transcript))

Following presentation of the

evidence, the Committee took the matter under advisement. On July 27, 2011, the Committee
entered the Hearing Committee Decision. (R., pp. 183-213.) That Decision recommended that
Respondent be disbarred. (R., p. 212.)
On August 11, 2011, Appellant filed his Motion to Alter or Amend and Request for
Hearing. (R., pp. 214-248.) On August 18,2011, the ISB filed its Memorandum in Response to
Motion to Alter or Amend and Request for Hearing. (R., pp. 249-257.) On August 23, 2011,
Appellant filed his Reply to Plaintiff s Response to Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend.
(R., pp. 258-263.)
On November 9,2011, the Committee issued its Decision on Motion to Alter or Amend
and Request for Hearing. (R., pp, 264-268.) The Committee denied the Motion to Alter or
Amend, recommended Appellant be disbarred, but recommended that the effective date of the

I

disbarment be February 1, 2010.

(R., p. 267.)

On November 15, 2011, the Clerk of the

Professional Conduct Board filed the Supplemental Certificate of Record Following Remand.
Appellant file his Notice of Appeal on December 3, 201].
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C.

Statement of Facts

The Committee's Decision summarized the stipulated facts and contained additional
findings of fact. (R., pp. 184-205.) The Committee initially specified Appellant's disciplinary
history with the Idaho and Oregon state bars.

In June 2001, Appellant was publically

reprimanded by a Hearing Committee of the Professional Conduct Board for violations of
I.R.P .C. 1.3, 1.4, 1.15( d) and 8.4( d). The public reprimand provided that Appellant accepted a
$200 flat fee to accomplish an expungement sought by his client, Maldonado. Maldonado made
numerous inquiries about the progress of the matter. At first, Appellant assured him the matter
was in progress.

Later Maldonado had difficulty in reaching Appellant at all.

Maldonado determined that the expungement proceeding had never been filed.

Ultimately,
Appellant

maintained that he did file the expungement, but the paperwork had been lost in the court system.
Appellant agreed to refund the $200 fee for the services to Maldonado, but the check bounced.
Maldonado eventually filed a small claims case to obtain return of the $200 and Appellant paid
Maldonado $200 plus the small claim filing fee following mediation. (Exhibits 9, pp. 50-51, 8386.)
On January 23, 2003, Bar Counsel issued Appellant a private reprimand relating to his
representation of Harris in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Appellant did not respond to the
notice of intent to dismiss the petition and the petition was dismissed. Despite Harris' multiple
efforts to contact Appellant, Appellant did not advise Harris of the dismissal and Harris was
advised about the dismissal of the petition from the court.

Appellant appealed the private

reprimand. On August 26, 2003, the Hearing Committee changed the sanction to an informal
admonition, giving significant consideration to the mitigating circumstance that Appellant had
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instructed his staff to follow normal procedures to send the dismissal notice to Harris. (Exhibit
9, pp. 51-52, 78-82.)
In August 2004, Appellant resigned from the Oregon State Bar in lieu of discipline.
Consistent with the Oregon bar rules, the resignation did not include an admission of any
violations of the Oregon rules of professional conduct, but the Oregon bar rules prohibit
Appellant from ever applying for reinstatement. If the Oregon bar rules change in the future to
allow Appellant to apply for reinstatement, his application will be treated as if he had been
disbarred and he will not be entitled to challenge the validity of the allegations in the Oregon bar
complaints. (R., p. 185.)
In that case, the Oregon State Bar had filed two formal charge complaints. The first
formal charge complaint was filed in December 2002 and charged Appellant with 21 violations
of the Oregon disciplinary rules, including, among other things, two counts of engaging in

I
I

dishonesty and misrepresentation, three counts of failure to cooperate and failure to truthfully
respond to disciplinary authorities, seven counts of neglect of legal matters, one count of failure
to deposit and maintain client trust funds, four counts of failure to prepare complete and adequate
records and failure to account for client funds, and three counts of failure to promptly deliver
client property. Appellant admitted that he violated the Oregon bar rules regarding cooperation
and responding to disciplinary authorities. While the first complaint was pending in Oregon, a
second complaint was filed in June 2004 charging Appellant with 12 violations of the Oregon

I
I
I

disciplinary rules.

Those violations included, among other things, four counts of failure to

cooperate and failure to respond truthfully to disciplinary authorities, one count of neglect of a
legal matter, one count of failure to prepare complete and adequate records and failure to account
for client funds, one count of failure to promptly deliver client property, one count of dishonesty
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or misrepresentation, one count of excessive fees, and one count of failure to deposit and
maintain client funds in trust. (R., pp. 203-204.)
In June 2005, the ISB filed a reciprocal proceeding against Appellant based upon the
Oregon disciplinary proceedings. In September 2005, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the
reciprocal disciplinary case, which was denied by a Hearing Committee in November 2005. The
hearing on the reciprocal case was held in December 2005.

Following hearing, the parties

submitted proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations. In March 2007,
the Hearing Committee issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation.
(Exhibit 9, pp. 13-73.) The Hearing Committee found that Appellant had committed multiple
violations ofI.R.P.C. 1.2,1.3,1.4, 1.16(d) and 8.4(c), and one violation each ofI.R.P.C. 1.5(f)
and 8.4(d). Those violations related to Appellant's representation of 7 clients in Oregon in a
variety of post-conviction relief proceedings. (Exhibit 9, pp. 13-77.)

I
I
!

On January 17,2008, this Court issued its Disciplinary Order in that reciprocal case. The
Disciplinary Order suspended Appellant for 5 years, with 3 years of that suspension withheld.

"
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The Order specified conditions of reinstatement and a three year probation following
reinstatement, upon specified terms and conditions. (Exhibit 9, pp. 9-12.) Appellant was not
eligible to be reinstated until February 1, 2010.
The last instance of Appellant's disciplinary history before this case was in October 2008.
Bar Counsel issued a private reprimand to Appellant relating to his representation of a client,

I
I

Jensen, in an uncontested custody modification case, in which Jensen paid Appellant a fixed fee
for the representation.

(Exhibit 9, p. 1.)

Bar Counsel determined that Appellant violated

I.R.P.C. I.2(a) and 1.4 by failing to abide by Jensen's decisions concerning the objectives of

I

I
fll'

I

representation, failing to consult with Jensen as to the means by which his objectives would be
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pursued, failing to keep Jensen reasonably informed about the status of his custody modification
matter, failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information from Jensen and not
explaining the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to pelmit Jensen to make informed
decisions regarding the representation. (Exhibit 9, pp. 1-8.)
In March 2008, the Client Assistance Fund of the ISB paid Loretta Vermette $7,280,
following a client assistance fund matter contested by Appellant. Count One of the Complaint
relates to Appellant's representation of Loretta's son Robert Illingworth and that Client
Assistance Fund claim.
With respect to the allegations in Count Two of this case, an appeal was dismissed by
stipulation to enable Robert Hall to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim against
Appellant relating to Appellant's trial representation. In March 2009, Mr. Hall's counsel filed a
StipUlation for Entry of Judgment stating that substantial investigation showed the only claim for
post-conviction relief that had any realistic chance of being embraced by the court was the
Appellant's failure to file a Rule 35 motion for Mr. Hall. In December 2009, the Court entered
an amended order granting a Rule 35 relief that concluded Mr. Hall's Rule 35 proceedings. In

I
I

May 2010, the ISB filed the Complaint in this case.
The Committee noted Count Three had been dismissed. Bar Counsel and Appellant had
a number of discussions relating to Count Three of the Complaint and Appellant provided Bar
Counsel with letters from the supervisors of yellow page directory listings that proved that the
identification of Appellant as an attorney during his suspension was the mistake of those

I

companies. Appellant also demonstrated that his representation of the client identified in Count
Three was permissible follow up to his prior representation in bankruptcy court and consequently

II"I!~

I~I.
I
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the parties agreed that Count Three was dismissed in its entirety for lack of clear and convincing
evidence supporting the alleged violations. (R., pp. 110-111.)
The Hearing Committee found the following facts m this case.

In 2005, Robert

Illingworth ("Robert") pled guilty to felony injury to a child and was sentenced. (R., pp. 188189.)

In March 2006, Robert's parole was denied.

Thereafter, he contacted Appellant to

represent him in attempting to obtain an early release. (R., p. 189.) In April 2006, Loretta
Vermette ("Loretta"), Robert's mother, paid Appellant a $2,000 fixed fee to travel to Orofino to
consult with Robert. (R., p. 189.) Appellant met with Robert in Orofino and then sent him a
letter discussing his proposed strategy and requesting a $10,000 "retainer deposit" to be billed at
his $200 dollar hourly rate. In June 2006, Loretta sent Appellant the $10,000 retainer fee. (R., p.

I
I
I

189.)
On July 28, 2006, Robert sent Appellant a letter terminating his representation and
requesting a full refund. (R., p. 189.) On July 31, 2006, Loretta filed a disciplinary grievance
and a Client Assistance Fund claim seeking reimbursement of $12,000 based on Appellant's
alleged failure to perform the requested work on Robert's case. (R., p. 189.)
On March 30, 2007, the Client Assistance Fund Committee ("CAF Committee") held a
hearing. Appellant submitted a copy of his time records from May through July 2006, reflecting
that he performed 13.6 hours of work on Robert's case, in addition to the Orofino consultation

~I

D

for which he was paid a $2,000 fixed fee.

(R., p. 189-190.) On June 27, 2007, the CAF

Committee entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. The CAF
Committee concluded that Appellant worked 13.6 hours for a total of $2,720 and also concluded
that because Appellant failed to return the unearned portion of the $10,000 retainer fee as

,
I
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required under I.R.P.c. 1.16(d), he engaged in dishonest conduct as defined in I.B.C.R. 601(e)
and recommended that Loretta be reimbursed $7,280. (R., p. 190.)
On July 26, 2007, the Board of Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar ("Board") issued
an Order of Remand to clarify a discrepancy regarding the amount Loretta claimed to have paid
Appellant.

The Board ordered the CAF Committee to recommend a dismissal if Appellant

reimbursed Loretta the amount determined by the CAF Committee. (R., p. 190.) On September
12,2007, the CAF Committee held a second hearing and issued Supplemental Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation.

The CAF Committee concluded that Loretta

submitted proof of $12,000 in payments to Appellant and that the $7,280 reimbursement amount
was correct.

The CAF Committee also stated it would recommend dismissal if Appellant

refunded that amount to Loretta within 14 days. Appellant did not refund the unearned fees. (R.,
p. 190.)
On November 30, 2007, the Board issued its Order conduding that Appellant's failure to
refund the unearned portion of the $10,000 retainer constituted dishonest conduct and affirmed
that Loretta's claim against the Client Assistance Fund be allowed in the amount of $7,280. (R.,
p. 191.) The Client Assistance Fund paid Loretta $7,280 on March 13,2008. Appellant has not
reimbursed the Fund for any portion of those funds. (R., p. 191.)
As a result of those admitted Count One factual allegations, Appellant admitted he
violated I.R.P .C. 1.16(d) [Failure to refund unearned fees upon termination of representation]
and I.R.P.c. 1.15(d) [Failure to keep property separate until a dispute between the lawyer and
client is resolved]. (R., p. 110.) The parties agreed that there was not clear and convincing
evidence that Appellant's failure to return the unearned fees upon termination of representation

II
Respondent's Brief - 12

involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation within the meaning of I.R.P.C. 8.4(c).
(R., p. 196.)

The Count Two facts related to Appellant's representation of Robert Hall ("Robert").
Robert was charged with trafficking drugs in 2001.

Appellant was appointed Robert's trial

counsel and filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the search of Robert's mother's home was
invalid for lack of probable cause. That motion was denied. (R., p. 191.) In July 2002, a jury
found Robert guilty of eight felony counts and a persistent violator charge. He was sentenced in
August 2002 to fixed term sentences totaling 39 years to run consecutively and indeterminate
terms totaling 20 years. Robert appealed, claiming the sentence was excessive and the district
court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD")
appointed to Robert's appeal determined that appealing the denial of the motion to suppress
would be frivolous and raised the single issue of whether the sentence was excessive. Robert's
sentence was affirmed by this Court in June 2003. (R., pp. 191-192.)

•
IfI

I

On February 19, 2004, Robert filed a pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction
Relief ("Petition"). The Petition did not specify any claim, but referenced an attached Affidavit
and Memorandum of Law ("Memorandum"). In the Memorandum, Robert listed a number of
claims and in his Affidavit raised the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon
Appellant's failure to raise the claims outlined in his Memorandum. Robert also claimed that the
SAPO was ineffective because she did not raise certain claims. (R., p. 192.)

·1&

I

The district court appointed Appellant to represent Robert during post-conviction
proceedings. (R., pp, 192-293.) On October 14, 2004, Appellant filed a Motion for Leave to
Amend the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was granted. (R., p. 193.) On November

II
I

12,2004, Respondent filed Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("Amended
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Petition").

In the Amended Petition, Appellant presented Robert's claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel and an invalid search warrant. Appellant omitted Robert's claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, thereby effectively waiving that claim.

The State

moved for summary dismissal of the Amended Petition. (R., p. 193.)
At the May 5, 2005 hearing on the Amended Petition and dismissal motion, the district
court dismissed Robert's invalid search warrant and arrest claim, but granted a continuance on
the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. (R., p. 193.) On October 18, 2005, the
district court held an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim
and on February 13, 2006, entered an order denying that claim. Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal. (R., p. 193.)
During appeal, attorney Robin Fyffe represented Robert and requested a remand based
upon Appellant's conflict of interest. The State agreed that the case should be remanded so that
Robert could reassert the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, since that claim was
waived because Appellant did not include it in the Amended Petition. (R., pp. 193-194.)
On March 7, 2007, the Idaho Court of Appeals remanded the post-conviction case for
further proceedings. That Court noted that Appellant's inclusion of an ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim would have required that he allege his own representation had been legally
deficient and concluded that that conflict of interest directly resulted in the waiver of Robert's
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. (R., p. 194.) The case was remanded to the district
court to appoint new counsel to litigate that claim. The denial of the claim for relief based upon
the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was affirmed. (R., p. 194.)

I
I

In October 2007, attorney Keith Roark filed Robert's Second Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief ("Second Petition"). The Second Petition listed six grounds for relief based
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upon Appellant's alleged failure to provide effective assistance as trial counsel, including
Appellant's failure to file a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of Robert's sentence. (R., pp.
194-195.)
Following the proceedings on remand, on March 9, 2009, Mr. Roark filed a Stipulation
for Entry of Judgment stating that substantial investigation showed that the only claim for postconviction relief that had any realistic chance of being embraced by the court was Appellant's
failure to file a Rule 35 motion. The State did not concede that relief would be granted, but
agreed that the court should grant post-conviction relief by entering a judgment permitting a
hearing on the Rule 35 motion in order to avoid further lengthy, time consuming and expensive
proceedings and in the interest of justice. All other grounds for relief set forth in the Second
Petition were dismissed with prejudice.

The court entered a judgment consistent with the

stipulation. (R., p. 195.)
On July 16, 2009, Mr. Roark filed a Rule 35 motion and hearings on that motion were
held in November 2009. The court entered the final order granting Rule 35 relief on December
3, 2009. Under that order, the mandatory minimum sentences of the three fixed terms ran
consecutively to comprise a minimum fixed term of 18 years, as opposed to the 39 years in the
original sentence. All portions of the sentences imposed on the other five counts and/or any
sentence related to the persistent violator charge ran concurrently with the mandatory minimum
sentences. The indeterminate portions of the sentences, totaling 20 years, were unchanged. (R.,

I
I
I

pp.195-196.)
Appellant admitted that he violated I.R.P.C. 1.3 [Failing to act with reasonable
diligence]; 1.7(a) [Conflict of interest]; and 8.4(d) [Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice ] in Count Two. (R., p. 196.)
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The Committee also made additional findings of fact, which can generally be described
as mitigating and aggravating circumstances relating to the Committee's recommended
discipline. The Committee initially noted that Appellant had been a social studies government
teacher in the Meridian School District since January 2011. CR., p. 198.)
With respect to Count One, the Committee found that Appellant believed that he was
under attack by Loretta and Robert and that Loretta lied about or misrepresented certain facts,
and created false evidence against him. Appellant felt he needed to defend himself from this
attack. CR., p. 198.) Appellant admitted that he could have handled the claim for reimbursement
of attorney fees to Loretta differently or better. CR., p. 198.) He offered to sign a promissory
note in favor of the ISB after he filed for bankruptcy protection, but he has not signed a
promissory note in favor of the ISB for purposes of repaying the Client Assistance Fund and
although he asserted he intends to pay the ISB back for monies paid by the Fund, to date, he has
taken no steps to pay back the ISB. CR., p. 198.) The Committee also found that at the time
Appellant was appointed to represent Robert, he had resigned from the Oregon State Bar in the
face of two formal complaints alleging multiple violations of the applicable rules of professional
conduct, the ISB was investigating the imposition of reciprocal discipline, he was under
investigation for a complaint made by Jensen to the Idaho State Bar in October 2004, and he had
twice been disciplined by the Idaho State Bar. CR., p. 198.)
With respect to Count Two, Appellant testified that he advised Robert that there was a
conflict of interest in representing him on post-conviction, as there was a potential issue
regarding his own ineffectiveness as trial counsel.

CR., pp. 198-199.)

Although Appellant

asserted that Robert orally waived the conflict of interest, the Committee found that that was not
the case because Robert raised inelIectiveness of trial counsel in his Affidavit in support of his
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pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Committee did not find Appellant was credible
on that issue. CR., p. 199.) The Committee found that Appellant represented Robert for 16
months without raising the issue of his own ineffective assistance as trial counsel. CR., p. 199.)
The Committee found that at the time Appellant was appointed to represent Robert, he at least
was the subject of one formal charge complaint in Oregon and had twice been disciplined by the
ISB. CR., p. 199.)
The Committee also factually found that Appellant has repeatedly demonstrated a
reluctance to fully accept responsibility for his violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct or willingness to take steps necessary to correct harm caused by his violations. CR., p.
199.) The Committee found Appellant has repeatedly demonstrated a persistent lack of care
regarding compliance with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct by committing violations
even after he had been subject to multiple client complaints and multiple bar investigations in
two states, after the imposition of discipline in two separate matters, and while he was then being
investigated for violations of the rules of professional conduct.

CR., pp. 199-200.)

The

Committee found Appellant has a history of disciplinary matters which indicate a lack of
recognition of the reasonable standards of conduct in the area of client communication and fee
related issues and a pattern of misconduct. CR., p. 200.) The Committee found the number of
disciplinary actions taken against Appellant and the number of formal charge cases against him
is unusually high. CR., p. 200.) After reviewing Appellant's disciplinary history set forth above,
the Committee found that over the period from approximately September 1997 to July 2006, a
period of less than nine years, Appellant represented fifteen clients who ultimately filed fifteen
disciplinary grievances against him. Apparently, no grievances were filed against the Appellant

I

with any Bar association for his conduct as a lawyer for approximately nineteen months between
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July 2006 and January 11, 2008, when his license was suspended.

However, Appellant's

wrongful conduct with respect to Loretta and Robert continued into November 2007, less than
two months before he was suspended pursuant to reciprocal discipline. The Committee found
that Appellant's wrongful conduct consisted of his continuing failure to repay any portion of the
retainer paid by Loretta for the representation of Robert, despite several orders, findings and
recommendations establishing his obligation to do so. In other words, at the same time the ISB
was assessing Appellant's conduct in Oregon for purposes of reciprocal discipline, the Appellant
was violating the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to Loretta and Robert
Illingworth. (R., pp. 204- 205.)
Finally, the Committee found that despite Appellant's knowledge of multiple prior bar
complaints against him, he acted in ways which were clearly contrary to the rules in both Counts
One and Two. (R., p. 205.)
The Committee also issued conclusions of law based upon the findings of fact set forth
above. With respect to Count One, the Committee found that in violating I.R.P .C. 1.1S(d) and
1.16(d), Appellant acted knowingly and intentionally, with the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result, i. e., the conversion of unearned professional fees, which he
continues to retain, and which caused injury to the clients, as the clients lacked the use of such
funds from the date Appellant's representation was terminated, July 28, 2006 until the clients

I

were paid from the Client Assistance Fund, March 13,2008. (R., pp. 205-206.) The Committee
also considered the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and noted that under those
standards disbarment is the appropriate sanction for violation of those rules when a lawyer
knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. (R., p. 207,

I

quoting ABA Standard 4.11) and that suspension is the appropriate sanction "when a lawyer
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knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or
potential injury to a client." (R., p. 207, quoting ABA Standard 4.12) The Committee concluded
that before analyzing relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate sanction
for the rule violations in Count One was disbarment. (R., p. 207.)
With respect to its analysis of the Count Two rule violations, the Committee noted that
under the ABA Standards for lack of diligence, I.R.P.C. 1.3, disbarment is an appropriate
sanction if a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
client.

(R., p. 208, quoting ABA Standard 4.41(a)) The Committee noted suspension is an

appropriate sanction if a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes
serious or potentially serious injury to a client. (R., pp. 208-209, quoting the ABA Standard
4.42(a)). The Committee concluded that before analyzing relevant aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, suspension is the appropriate sanction for Appellant's violation of I.R.P .C. 1.3 in
Count Two.
With respect to the conflict of interest violation, I.R.P.C. 1.7(a), in Count Two, the
Committee concluded that before analyzing the relevant aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, disbarment is an appropriate sanction when a lawyer, without the informed
consent of the client, engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer's interests are
adverse to the client's with the intent to benefit the lawyer and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to the client.

(R., p. 209, quoting ABA Standard 4.31(a)).

The Committee

concluded the appropriate sanction for Appellant's violation of I.R.P.C. 1.7(a) in Count Two is
disbarment. (R., p. 209.) Finally, with respect to the conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice violation, I.R.P .C. 8.4(d), in Count Two, the Committee noted that before analyzing the

I

relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate sanction when a
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lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document,
or improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to
a party, or causes a signiilcant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
(R., p. 210, quoting ABA Standard 6.1l.) The Committee concluded the appropriate sanction for
Appellant's violation ofI.R.P.C. 8.4(d) in Count Two is disbarment. (R., p. 210.)
The Committee next analyzed aggravating circumstances under ABA Standard 9.2 and
considered that Appellant had been the subject of prior disciplinary actions in Oregon and Idaho
and cannot claim ignorance or a lack of familiarity with the rules of professional conduct and the
disciplinary process. He had been investigated by the bars of both states for violations of those
rules before the conduct, which is at issue in this case, and he was under investigation for other
complaints atthe time of his conduct in this case. (R., p. 210.)
The Committee also concluded that the Appellant's motives with respect to Count One

II~I~
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were primarily selilsh, but not dishonest. (R., p. 210.) The Committee concluded that Appellant
has demonstrated a pattern of lack of diligence and failure to return the property of clients when
required, has committed multiple offenses, has demonstrated bad faith in failing to return
unearned fees to Loretta and Robert and in failing to repay the Client Assistance Fund. (R., p.
210.)

The Committee also found Appellant demonstrated an inability to fully accept

responsibility for his actions or in acknowledging clear violations of the rules. (R., p. 21l.) The
Committee found Appellant's clients in Counts One and Two were particularly vulnerable as
they faced criminal charges and/or were incarcerated and therefore vested considerable reliance
in Appellant. (R., p. 21l.) The Committee noted that Appellant had been licensed to practice
Jaw for at least 15 years and was experienced in the areas of Jaw in those cases. Finally, the
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Committee noted that Appellant has failed and continues to fail, to make restitution to Loretta or

I
III
I
I:
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the Client Assistance Fund. (R., p. 2] 1.)
The Committee next analyzed mitigating circumstances under ABA Standard 9.3 and
determined that Appellant has been relatively cooperative in the investigation of the current
disciplinary matters, appears to have a good reputation in the community, as demonstrated by
witnesses with high standing in the community who testified on his behalf, is currently under
suspension of significant duration, which contains adequate conditions of reinstatement and
probation and displays some remorse, although the Committee determined his remorse was
minimal and conditional. (R., p. 211.)
Based those findings of fact, conclusions of law, the ABA Standards and the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the Committee recommended that Appellant be disbarred. (R., p.
212.)

',I
II"·

Appellant then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Committee's Recommendation. The

I

Appellant requested the sanction be changed to a five year suspension to run from January 31,

,

2008 through January 31, 2013, to be followed by a four year probation.

Appellant also

suggested the Committee failed to consider all of his mitigating factors. (R., pp. 214-248.)
The ISB submitted its Memorandum in Response to the Motion to Alter or Amend. The
ISB argued that Appellant could have resigned in lieu of discipline in the Idaho reciprocal
disciplinary case in 2005, but chose not to and chose to contest the reciprocal disciplinary case.
The ISB argued that while Respondent was entitled to make the choice to contest the case, he
bears the responsibility for that choice. The ISB indicated that if the Committee was inclined to
retroactively begin any sanction as requested by Respondent, the date of the sanction should be
either February 1, 2010, when Appellant was eligible to be reinstated from his reciprocal
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suspension or May 20 I 0, when the formal charge Complaint in this case was filed. Bar Counsel
also indicated that if the Committee was inclined to reconsider the sanction, Bar Counsel would
not be adverse to stipulating to a resignation in lieu of discipline. (R., pp. 249-250.)
On November 9,2011, the Committee issued is Decision on Motion to Alter or Amend.
The Committee indicated that it devoted a significant amount of time and effort in deciding the
case and did not come to its decision lightly or without considering all of the facts, including
those in mitigation of Appellant's conduct. (R., pp. 264-265.) The Committee concluded, after
consideration of all of the mitigating evidence cited by Appellant, that it fully and fairly
considered all relevant mitigating factors. The Committee still recommended that Appellant be
disbarred, but believed the recommended disbarment should be served consecutively not

I

concurrently and that a starting date of disbarment of February 1, 2010 would be "commensurate
with the nature and severity of the violations committed by the Defendant and his disciplinary
history." (R., p. 267.)

I
I
I
I
I

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the Idaho Supreme Court reviews an attorney discipline action, it independently
examines the record developed before the Professional Conduct Board "to determine whether the
evidence supports the findings and recommendation of the Board's hearing committee." Idaho

State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86, 90, 44 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2002); Idaho State Bar v. Frazier,
136 Idaho 22, 25, 28 P.3d 363, 366 (2001); Idaho State Bar v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 505, 129
P.3d 1251, 1254 (2006). The Court will examine the hearing committee's decision to determine
if it is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86,
90, 44 P .3d ] 141, 1145 (2002); Idaho State Bar v. Gatenbein, l3 3 Idaho 316, 319, 986 P.2d 339,

~PII
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342 (1999); Idaho State Bar v. Everard, 142 Idaho 109, 112, 124 P.3d 985,988 (2005). The
hearing committee's findings are entitled to great weight. Id.
The disciplined attorney has the burden of showing the evidence does not support the
hearing committee's findings and recommendations. Idaho State Bar v. Malmin, 139 Idaho 304,
307, 78 P.3d 371, 374 (2003). The Court independently reviews the record and assesses the
evidence; nevertheless, the Court gives the hearing committee's findings of fact great weight.
The ultimate responsibility for assessing the facts and ordering the sanctions to be imposed
however rests with the Idaho Supreme Court. Jd. at 307-308, 78 P.3d at 374-375 and Idaho State
Bar v. Williams, 126 Idaho 839, 843, 893 P.2d 202, 206 (1995).
With respect to whether the Committee's recommendation

I
I
I

I

IS

clearly erroneous or

arbitrary and capricious, in Enterprise v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 739, 736 P.2d 729, 734
(1975), this Court reasoned:
For the City Council's actions to be deemed "arbitrary or capricious," it must be
shown that its actions were done without rational basis; were in disregard of the
facts and circumstances presented; or without adequate determining principles.
Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed
that an erroneous conclusion has been reached.
With respect to the clearly erroneous standard, since the findings and recommendation of
the Committee are analogous to a district court's findings, Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329,
332, 92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004), provides the following guidance:
This Court affirms a district court's findings of fact unless the findings are
"clearly erroneous." I.R.C.P. 52(a). Findings "based upon substantial and
competent, although conflicting, evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Bolger
v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) (citing DeChambeau v.
Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d 922, 925 (1999». This Court
exercises free review over matters of law. Id. (citing Bouten CanstI'. Co. v. H F.
Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999».
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Similarly, in Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497,500,767 P.2d 1272, 1275, (Ct. App. 1989), the
Court of Appeals stated:
As to the "clearly erroneous" standard under Rule 52(a), clear error will not be
deemed to exist if the court's findings are supported by substantial and competent,
though conflicting, evidence. Rasmussen v. Martin, 104 Idaho 401, 659 P.2d ] 55
(CL App. 1983). Where evidence is conflicting, the task of weighing such
evidence falls within the province of the trial court. Id. Finally, when a trial
court's findings of fact are challenged on appeal, the appellant has the burden of
showing error, and the reviewing court will review the evidence in a light most
favorable to the respondent. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d
51 (1979); Salazar v. Tilly, supra.

III.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant has raised the following issues on appeal:
A.

Did the Committee erroneously determine that the proper sanction for the violations was
disbarment?

B.

I

I
I

Should the sanction imposed begin on January 31, 2008 and run concurrently with the
suspension Appellant is currently serving?

C.

Is the ISB estopped from arguing against its earlier statements that the appropriate
sanction is a suspension that should begin on January 31, 2008?

D.

Did the Committee ignore, or at least fail to fully acknowledge competent relevant
material mitigation evidence offered at hearing?

E.

Did this Court violate Appellant's due process rights in rejecting the initial Stipulation?

F.

Were the Committee decisions too late and therefore arbitrary and capricious?

I'I
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IV.

ARUGMENT
Appellant has not satisfied his burden of showing that the evidence does not support the
Committee's recommendation and that the Committee's recommendation is clearly erroneous or
arbitrary and capricious. The Committee's determination that Appellant should be disbarred
effective February 1, 2010, has a rational basis and is consistent with the facts and circumstances
presented to the Committee and consistent with the determining principles, i.e, the Idaho Rules
of Professional Conduct, the ABA Standards and other disciplinary cases. The Committee's
findings, conclusions and recommendation are entitled to great weight and are based upon
substantial and competent evidence. As a consequence, the Court should impose the sanction
recommended by the Committee.
A.

The Committee's determination that the proper sanction should be

disbarment was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious.

Appellant argues that the Committee's recommended sanction of disbarment was
erroneous. Appellant argues that the Committee arbitrarily and capriciously ignored relevant
evidence and failed to correctly apply the ABA Standards. However, the record reveals that the
evidence supports the Committee's findings, conclusions and recommendation, the Committee's
recommendation has a rational basis, and is consistent with the facts and circumstances presented
to the Committee. In addition, the Committee properly applied the ABA Standards.

IId,

Appellant first challenges the Committee's determination that the circumstances relating
to his representation of Robert Hall in Count Two merit the recommended sanction of
disbarment.

Appellant's challenge fails for several reasons.

First, the Committee properly

evaluated all three of the violations in Count Two, LR.P.C. 1.3, 1.7(a) and 8.4(d) before
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concluding that the recommended sanction for those violations was disbarment.

Appellant

ignores the Committee's evaluation of the violations ofI.R.P.C. 1.3 and 8.4(d), choosing instead
to focus solely on the conflict of interest violation, I.R.P.C. 1.7(a).
Initially, the Committee concluded that based upon ABA Standard 4.42, in evaluating the
violation of I.R.P.C. 1.3, lack of diligence, suspension is an appropriate sanction when the
lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious·
injury to a client. The Committee concluded that, before analyzing relevant aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, suspension was the appropriate sanction for Appellant's violation of
I.R.P.C. 1.3. (R., pp. 207-208.)
Appellant focuses on the violation of I.R.P.C. 1.7(a), an impermissible conflict of
interest, which admittedly is the focal point in Count Two. However, the Committee properly
evaluated the ABA Standards in addressing that violation.

The Committee analyzed ABA

Standard 4.31 (a) and concluded that before analyzing the relevant aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate sanction because Appellant, without the informed
consent of his client, engaged in representation knowing that his interests were adverse to the
client's with the intent to benefit himself and caused serious or potentially serious injury to the
client.

(R., p. 209.)

Based upon that, the Committee properly concluded the appropriate

sanction for Appellant's violation ofI.R.P.C. 1.7(a) was disbarment.

I
I
I
I

With respect to the violation of I.R.P.c. 8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice, the Committee concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction under ABA
Standard 6.11, for the violation of I.R.P.C. 8.4(d) when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the
court, makes a false statement, submits a false document or properly withholds material, and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially
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significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding. (R., p. 210.) The Committee recognized that
the impact of Appellant's professional misconduct upon the legal proceedings involving Robert,
were significant and adverse.
Appellant'S conscious removal of Robert's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel had an adverse effect on the administration of justice. Robert's initial postconviction relief claims were decided by the district court in February 2006. Robert appealed
and during the appeal, his new counsel requested a remand based upon Appellant's conflict of
interest. The State agreed that the case should be remanded and in March 2007, the Idaho Court
of Appeals remanded the post-conviction case for further proceedings recognizing that
Appellant's conflict of interest directly resulted in the waiver of Robert's ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claim. (R., p. 194.) Robert's new post-conviction attorney commenced the
second round of post-conviction proceedings in October 2007. Following those proceedings and
following more hearings, the court entered Rule 35 relief in December 2009. As noted, the
minimum fixed term of 39 years was reduced to 18 years, but that fact that Robert's sentence
was reduced, potentially as a result of Appellant's misconduct, is not entirely relevant to the
impact Appellant's misconduct had on Robert's legal proceedings and the administration of

I

justice. Appellant's misconduct resulted in almost four additional years of appeals and postconviction proceedings that would have been unnecessary if Appellant did not continue to
represent Robert in the face of an impennissible conflict of interest. The Committee correctly
concluded that was a significant adverse effect on the legal proceedings.
Thus, Appellant's contention the recommendation of disbarment IS arbitrary and
capricious based solely on his analysis of the I.R.P .C. 1.7 violation fails to consider all of the
Committee's rationale for its recommendation. In addition, Appellant argues that solely because
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III,.

he believes Robert suffered no injury, ABA Standards 4.33 and 4.34 are applicable to the
analysis of that violation. However the Committee's recommendation is based upon substantial
and competent evidence, is not arbitrary and capricious, even though Appellant believes an
erroneous conclusion was reached.
Appellant claims Robert suffered no damage. The Committee disagreed. In fact, at hearing,
one of the Committee members indicated that while Robert may have had his sentence reduced
because of Appellant's professional misconduct, employing a broader perspective of injury to
consider the protection of the public, it was reasonable to consider that a reduction of a sentence
for a potentially dangerous criminal defendant was injury or damage to the public and the
administration of justice. (R., pp. 132-133.)
Moreover, the Committee's recommendation of disbarment in Count Two was arrived at
before analyzing the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the ABA

I

1

Standards.

A review of the Committee's evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances, detailed at pages 20-21 above, demonstrates that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed

the

mitigating

circumstances

and

further

supported

the

Committee's

recommendation. For example, this is Appellant's third formal charge case in Idaho and he

1

1
I
1

resigned in lieu in Oregon facing two formal charge cases. In addition, the Committee "devoted
a significant amount of time and effort in deciding the case and did not come to a decision lightly
or without considering all of the facts, including those in mitigation of Appellant's conduct."
(R., pp. 264-265.) Thus, Appellant simply places more weight on the mitigating circumstances
and less weight on the aggravating circumstances than the Committee did. As a consequence,
Appellant believes that an erroneous conclusion has been reached, but even assuming the
evidence is conflicting, the task of weighing the evidence and applying the ABA Standards to
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that evidence falls within the province of the Committee and the Court.

The Committee's

recommendation of disbarment is the appropriate sanction for the Count Two violations, is not
clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious.
Appellant also challenges the Committee's recommendation that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction for the violations ofLR.P.C. 1.16(d) and 1.15(d) in Count One. Appellant's
challenge fails for similar reasons. Appellant cites the same ABA Standards that the Committee
considered, 4.11 and 4.12. The Committee concluded that before analyzing relevant aggravating

II

I

and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate sanction for the rule violations in Count One was
disbarment.

(R., p. 207.)

The Committee concluded that Appellant acted knowingly and

intentionally, with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result, i.e., the
conversion of unearned professional fees, which he continues to retain, and which caused injury
to the clients, as the clients lacked the use of such funds from the date Appellant's representation

iii

I

was terminated, July 28, 2006, until the clients were paid from the Client Assistance Fund,
March 13, 2008.

(R., pp. 205-206.)

Under ABA Standard 4.11, the Committee correctly

concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for a violation of those rules because
Appellant knowingly converted Loretta's property and caused injury to Robert and Loretta. (R.,

1
1

p.207.)

I"I

Appellant a letter terminating his representation on July 28, 2006. At the Client Assistant Fund

Appellant argues that Count One was a dispute over fees.

That is incredulous and

·1

II

contrary to the facts. Loretta paid a $10,000 retainer fee to Appellant in June 2006. Robert sent

hearing, seven months after Appellant was terminated, Appellant submitted a copy of his time

I

'I·

records reflecting that he performed 13.6 hours of work on Robert's case, in addition to the
Orofino consultation for which he was paid a $2,000 fixed fee. (R., pp. 189-190.) On June 27,

i~l
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2007, the CAF Committee entered its recommendation that concluded that because Appellant
failed to return the unearned portion of the $10,000 retainer fee, $7,280, under I.R.P.C. 1.16(d),
he engaged in dishonest conduct as defined in I.B.C.R. 601(e) and recommended that Loretta be

Ilf~

•
!(I~

reimbursed that amount. Later the Board ordered the CAF Committee to recommend dismissal
if Appellant reimbursed Loretta the amount determined by the CAF Committee.

The CAF

Committee held a second hearing and concluded if Appellant reimbursed Loretta $7,280 of
Ilfl

I

unearned fees within 14 days it would recommend dismissal of the CAF claim. Appellant did
not return the unearned fees. (R., p. 190.)
The Client Assistance Fund paid Loretta $7,280, almost two years following Appellant's
termination of representation.

The circumstances reveal the failure to return unearned fees

constituted a knowing conversion that caused damage to Loretta and Robert, and was more than
a fee dispute.

In addition, under I.R.P.C. 1.15(d), Appellant was obligated to distribute all

portions of the $10,000 retainer fee not in dispute. Clearly, the fee dispute could not be $7,280,

I
II

given Appellant's own time records. The Committee applied the appropriate ABA Standard to
such misconduct.
The Committee's recommendation that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for
Appellant's Count One professional misconduct is supported by the record and respects the
determining principles, the ABA Standards and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
Consequently, the Committee's recommended sanction for the Count One violations is not
clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious.
B.

The Hearing Committee's recommendation that the effective date of the

recommended disbarment be February 1,2010 is not clearly erroneous or arbitrary
and capricious.
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Appellant argues that his period of suspension should start January 31, 2008 and run
concurrently with the suspension he is currently serving.

In support of his argument, Appellant

cites the October 6, 2010 StipUlation which was rejected by this Court in the Order to Remand.
That order remanded the case to the Committee "for the reconsideration of more significant
sanctions."

(R., p. 184.)

That Stipulation also provided that, "if the Committee of the

Professional Conduct Board or the Idaho Supreme Court declines to accept this Stipulation
and/or Recommendation, each party has the right to withdraw from this stipUlation and proceed
to hearing on the merits." (R., p. 38.) Appellant made this same argument to the Hearing
Committee in his Motion to Alter or Amend, which was properly rejected. (R., pp. 214-248.)

I
I
I
I'I
I

The Committee's recommendation that the disbarment should be effective February 1, 2010 is
sound.
Appellant's argument is essentially that any suspension for this disciplinary case must run
concurrently with his suspension in the reciprocal case. However, that is neither required, nor
supported by the record.
In the Oregon disciplinary proceedings, the first fom1al charge Complaint was filed on
December 2002 and the second Complaint was filed in June 2004. In August 2004, Appellant
resigned from the Oregon State Bar in lieu of discipline.

The Idaho reciprocal disciplinary

proceeding was filed in June 2005. The first thing Appellant did in that case was file a motion to
dismiss the reciprocal disciplinary case. That motion was denied and the matter proceeded to

•
III
III

hearing. The hearing was required because Appellant denied all the rule violations related to his
resignation in lieu of discipline in Oregon, since under the Oregon rules the resignation did not
include an admission of any violations of the Oregon rules of professional conduct. In March
2007, the Committee issued its Recommendation and found that Appellant had committed

I
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multiple violations of LR.P.C. l.2, l.3, lA, l.l6( d) and SA( c) and one violation of each I.R.P .C.
I'I~

I

1.5(f) and SA(d).

Those violations related to Appellant's representation of seven clients

III

Oregon in a variety of post-conviction relief proceedings. (Exhibit 9, pp. 13-77.)
This Court issued its Disciplinary Order in the reciprocal case on January 17, 200S. That

,
I

I

order suspended Appellant for five years, with three years of that suspension withheld.
Appellant was not eligible to reinstated until February 1, 2010.
The facts and circumstances underlying this case did not conclude until March 200S

I

(Count One) and December 2009 (Count Two). The Client Assistance Fund payment to Loretta
was made in March 200S, and in Robert's case, the court order concluding the Rule 35
proceedings, necessitated by Appellant's conflict of interest, was entered in December 2009. In
May 2010, before Appellant sought reinstatement, this disciplinary case was filed. (R., pp. 251252.)

I-I'

r

A consideration of the timing of the reciprocal and this disciplinary case reflects the
propriety of the Committee's recommended disbarment date, February 1,2010. The Committee
rejected Appellant's request that the disbarment be retroactive to January 31, 200S, for a number
of reasons. First, Appellant could have resigned in lieu of discipline in the Idaho reciprocal
disciplinary case in 2005. However, Appellant chose not to and chose to contest every aspect of
the reciprocal disciplinary case through hearing. That was Appellant's choice and the eventual
sanction entered was less time than a resignation in lieu of discipline would have been.

l,
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I

Appellant was entitled to choose to contest that case, but Appellant should bear the responsibility
for that choice.
Second, there was no material delay between the conclusion of the Oregon disciplinary
proceedings and the commencement of the Idaho reciprocal disciplinary proceedings. Third,

I

"
I
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Appellant practiced law in Idaho from the start of the reciprocal proceeding in June 200S until

I

January 31, 2008. Fourth, when Appellant was eligible for reinstatement, Appellant did not
submit a request for reinstatement, despite the fact that I.B.C.R. S18(b)(1) provides that a
petition for reinstatement by a suspended lawyer may be filed no sooner than 90 days before the
end of his suspension. Fifth, there was no material delay in this disciplinary case since the
circumstances relating to the consequences of Appellant's misconduct alleged in Count Two
were not known before December 2009, even though Appellant's conduct occurred well before

~I

I

that date. Finally, Bar Counsel agreed to stipulate to a resignation in lieu of discipline if the

III
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I

Committee recommended or otherwise approved that Bar Counsel do so.

However, the

Committee decided that disbarment was appropriate based upon the record.

Consequently,

Appellant has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that the Committee's recommended
effective disbarment date of February 1,2010 is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious.

II1I

'lk1

c.

The Idaho State Bar is not estopped from recommending that the

appropriate sanction should be a suspension that should begin January 31, 2008.
Appellant argues that the Idaho State Bar cannot change its position from the October 6,

'~I'

2010 Stipulation, that was rejected by this Court. That stipUlation provided that if the Court
rejected the Committee's recommendation, each party has the right to withdraw from the
Stipulation and proceed to hearing on the merits. That provision was consistent with I.B.C.R.
S14(a)(l). (R., p. 38.) The Court's Order to Remand remanded the case to the Committee for

III

1
1
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the reconsideration of more significant sanctions. The Court's remand to the Committee was
consistent with I.B.C.R. S14(b)(2) and I.B.C.R. S11(k)(2). The effective date of any sanction
clearly falls within the scope of a more significant sanction.

Finally, even Appellant

acknowledges the principle of judicial estoppel is not applicable to these circumstances and that

,J'I~I

I
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his real argument is that ISB cannot alter its position. (Brief, p. 33.) For these reasons and the

I
I
I

reasons set forth in the preceding section, the ISB is not bound by the prior stipUlation or
estopped from arguing that the sanction should start from a different date.

D.

The Committee did not ignore or fail to fully acknowledge competent

relevant material mitigation evidence offered at hearing.

Appellant argues that the Committee ignored, or at least failed to fully acknowledge
competent, relevant, material mitigation evidence offered during the April 4, 2012 hearing.
However, Appellant's argument is contrary to the record and the Committee's decisions. In its
initial decision, the Committee analyzed the aggravating circumstances under ABA Standard 9.2

I

The Committee then analyzed the mitigating factors under ABA Standard 9.3. The Committee
considered that Appellant had been relatively cooperative in the investigation of the current
disciplinary matter, appeared to have a good reputation in the community, as demonstrated by

IIII'

witnesses with high standing in the community who testified on his behalf, is currently under
suspension of significant duration and which contains adequate conditions of reinstatement and
probation and that he displays some remorse, although the Committee determined his remorse
was minimal and conditional. (R., p. 211.)
Following its consideration of the ABA Standards and those aggravating and mitigating
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circumstances, the Committee recommended Appellant be disbarred. (R., p. 212.) Appellant
then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Committee's Decision. In that motion, Appellant
argued that the Committee failed to find all the mitigating circumstances established by the
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record in the case, reiterated what Appellant considered were mitigating circumstances and
devoted eight pages to discussing those mitigating circumstances. (R., pp. 217-224.) Similarly,
Appellant's Brief, devotes eighteen pages to a recitation of the mitigation evidence he presented
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at hearing. (Brief pp. 7-24) Finally, Appellant attached fourteen mitigation evidence exhibits to
his Brief.
In its decision on the Motion to Alter or Amend, the Committee initially noted that it
devoted a significant amount of time and effort in deciding the case, was very aware of the
import of its decision and its affect on Appellant. (R. p., 264.) The Committee said it "did not
come to its decision lightly and certainly did not come to its decision without a full consideration
of all of the facts, including those in mitigation of Appellant's conduct." (R., p. 265.) The
Committee continued by referencing Appellant's contention that the Committee "failed to find
all of the mitigating circumstances established by the record in this case," and then delineated the
fourteen mitigating facts Appellant believed the Committee failed to consider. (R., pp. 265-266.)

I
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Based upon all of that, the Committee concluded that it fully and fairly considered all relevant

I
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mitigating factors. (R., p. 266.)
Moreover, in response to Appellant's argument, that the Committee was unfair when the
Committee described Appellant as being only relatively cooperative and showing only minimal
and conditional remorse, the Committee said that statement only emphasized the Appellant's
refusal to accept full responsibility for his actions. Based upon those conclusions, the Committee
affirmed its conclusion that disbarment was appropriate. (R., pp. 266-267.)
Thus, Appellant's contention that the Committee failed to acknowledge mitigation
evidence and ignored mitigation evidence is contrary to both of the Committee's decisions. The

I
I
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Committee's decisions did not disregard mitigating circumstances and those decisions were not
clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious in this regard.
Apparently, as part of his contention that the Committee failed to consider mitigation and
that a five year suspension is the appropriate sanction, Appellant discusses other disciplinary
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cases at pages 38-42 of his Brief.

While those cases address general principles relating to

disciplinary cases and sanctions, their utility is limited by the different facts and disciplinary
history in this case. Disciplinary cases are fact driven and the conduct and sanctions in the cases
addressed are not as instructive to the appropriate sanction as the Committee's detailed factual
findings and conclusions based upon the ABA Standards.
However, one case that is potentially related to this case is Idaho State Bar v. Tway, 128
Idaho 794, 919 P.2d 794 (1996). As Appellant points out, in Tway, the Court entered a five year
suspension and rejected the Hearing Committee's disbarment recommendation. However, the
circumstances in Tway are factually distinguished in one important respect.

The Court

recognized Tway's misconduct occurred around the same time as the conduct he had previously
been suspended for and was part of an ongoing pattern of misconduct that the Court had already
addressed. Id. at 799,919 P.2d at 328. Unlike, Tway, Appellant's material misconduct in this
case occurred in 2006-2008 (Count One) and in 2004-2005 (Count Two) and was not specifically
within the pattern of misconduct relating to his prior public reprimand in 2001, or the Oregon
representation that occurred years before that case started in December 2002 and then was

I
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amended to reflect conduct that occurred after that date and before June 2004, or the reciprocal
suspension based thereon imposed January 31, 2008.

Appellant's numerous instances of

misconduct and the Committee's findings and conclusions differ materially from Tway and the
other cases cited by Appellant.

The reliance on those cases does not establish that the

Committee's recommendation is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious.
E.

The Idaho Supreme Court did not violate Appellant's due process rights by

rejecting the Committee's Recommendation based upon the October 2010
Stipulation.
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Appellant argues that this Court violated his rights to due process by rejecting the
Committee's October 27, 2010 Recommendation, which was based upon the October 6,2010
StipUlation. The primary defect with Appellant's argument is that if fails to acknowledge that
the ultimate responsibility for assessing the facts and ordering disciplinary sanctions to be
imposed rests with the Idaho Supreme Court. Idaho State Bar v. Maim in, 139 Idaho 304, 307308, 78 P.3d 371, 374-375 (2003) and Idaho State Bar v. Williams, 126 Idaho 839, 843, 893 P.2d
202,206 (1995). The Idaho Supreme Court independently examines the record developed before
the Professional Conduct Board to determine whether the evidence supports the findings,
conclusions and recommendation of the Committee. Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86,
90,44 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2002); Idaho State Bar v. Frazier, 136 Idaho 22, 25, 28 P.3d 363, 366
(2002); and Idaho State Bar v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 505, 129 P.3d 1251, 1254 (2006). In
addition, the Idaho Supreme Court's consideration and rejection of the October 2010

I

Recommendation based on the stipUlation was consistent with its rules, I.B.C.R. 514(b )(2) and
I.B.C.R.511(k)(2).
Appellant's argument that due process was violated solely by a rejection of the
Recommendation based upon a stipulation fails. Following the Order to Remand, Appellant was
afforded a hearing before the Committee. The Committee issued its decision, which included
detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation.

(R., pp. 185-213.)

Following that decision, Appellant, filed his motion to alter or amend the Committee's
II

III

recommendation, consistent with the process permitted by I.B.C.R. 511 (h)(2). That motion was
fully briefed and then the Committee entered its second decision which altered its
recommendation from disbarment from the date of any disciplinary order to disbarment effective
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February 1,2010. (R., pp. 264-268.)
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Appellant was given notice of the facts and issues regarding his professional misconduct
in the Complaint. He answered that complaint and denied the misconduct. Appellant had a
hearing and an opportunity to present why the Committee's initial decision following that
hearing should be altered. Finally, Appellant appealed the recommendation, his appeal has been
briefed, will be argued and decided by this Court. Consequently, Appellant has been afforded
due process throughout these proceedings. See, Idaho State Bar v. Everard, 142 Idaho, 109, 124
P.3d 985 (Idaho 2005). Appellant has not stated any basis for relief based upon a deprivation of
due process.
F.

The Committee did not violate Appellant's due process rights by issuing

decisions that were too late and therefore arbitrary and capricious.

I

Appellant argues that the Committee violated his due process rights by entering its first
decision more than 28 days following the conclusion of the hearing and by issuing its decision on
the motion to alter and amend more than 14 days following receipt of the motion under LB.C.R.

I

511 (h).

LB.C.R. 511 (h)(1) provides that the Committee shall send its findings of fact,

conclusions of law and recommendation to the Clerk within 28 days following the conclusion of
the hearing and I.B.C.R. 511 (h)(2) provides that the Committee shall, within 14 days of receipt

I

of a motion to alter or amend, alter or amend its decision, deny the motion or schedule it for
hearing. As an aside, the transcript of the April 4, 2011 hearing was not received from the court
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reporter until April 21, 2011.
However, I.B.C.R. 525(i) specifically states that, unless otherwise provided, "the time in
which any act or anything is to be done or performed is not jurisdictional." Therefore, contrary

IIII
I

to Appellant's argument, the timing of the entry of the Committee's decision following hearing
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and its decision following the motion to alter or amend were not jurisdictional and the
Committee did not violate due process by issuing its decisions when it did.
In addition, Appellant does not argue or provide any proof that the Committee's issuance
of its decisions prejudiced his interests. He has not been licensed to practice law in Idaho since
January 31, 2008 and even if the Court were enter the five year suspension as requested by
Appellant in his motion to alter or amend, he would not be eligible for reinstatement until
February 1, 2013. Therefore, the timing of the Committee's decisions did not affect Appellant's

I

ability to practice law. He has provided no proof of prejudice in other respects. Consequently,
the timing of the Committee's decisions are not jurisdictional, are not a deprivation of due
process, or clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious.

I

v.
CONCLUSION

III~Ir

The Committee's recommendation is based upon clear, convmcmg, substantial and

"

competent evidence. The Committee's findings are entitled to great weight. Appellant is unable
to satisfy the burden of showing that the evidence does not support the Committee's findings,
conclusions and recommendation and that the recommendation is clearly erroneous or arbitrary
and capricious. The Committee's recommended sanction is appropriate and the Court should
issue a discipline order consistent therewith.
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